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A NEW APPROACH TO RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
JAMES ANGELL MacLACHLAN*
Resale price maintenance has had a lively legal history. After court
decisions under the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission
Act had discouraged it in the first third of the current century,' it
was encouraged by Fair Trade Acts in so many states2 as to develop
an impractical cleavage between state and federal law. Congress
responded by passing the Miller-Tidings Act in 1937. 3 This made the
relevant antitrust laws inapplicable to resale price maintenance con-
tracts valid by the law of the state where resale is to be made. The
amendment conformed in essential respects to the structure of the
Fair Trade Acts, in relating only to merchandise identified by trade-
mark or trade name "in free and open competition with commodities
produced or distributed by others," and in denying validity to horizon-
tal agreements between manufacturers or between distributors.
Fair Trade Acts typically provide that where the owner of a trade-
mark or trade name has entered into resale price maintenance con-
tracts with some but not all distributors of his product, all such dis-
tributors in the jurisdiction are equally bound and subject to sanctions
under the law. The constitutionality of the "non-signer" clause was
upheld in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.
in 1936. 4 With the enactment of a few more Fair Trade Acts after
the Miller-Tidings Amendment, raising the total of states with such
laws to forty-five, 5 the difficulties to be encountered by fair trade
programs for over a decade were more practical than legal. But in
1951, the Supreme Court rather surprisingly held that the Miller-
Tidings Amendment gave no support to the non-signer provisions of
the Fair Trade Acts.6 Congress promptly reversed the result by the
Maguire Act in 1952,7 bringing the state and federal laws back into
alignment. But the last chapter had not been written. Of recent
years a considerable number of state courts have declared state Fair
* Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 441 (1922);
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
2. Forty-one states had Fair Trade Acts as of 1937 or earlier date; by Sept.
1, 1939, forty-four states had them. See W. P. A. State Price Control Legisla-
tion, 2 MARKETING LAW SuRvEy. xxxvi (1940). The statutes reprinted in said
survey support the count of forty-one. The table in id. at xlvi cites codes of
1938 and 1939 compiling earlier session laws.
3. Act of Aug. 17, 1937, 50 STAT. 693, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
4. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
5. There are none in Missouri, Texas, Vermont and the District of Co-
lumbia.
6. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
7. 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
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Trade Acts to be unconstitutional 8 and one federal district judge threw
the Maguire Act in for good measure, 9 although he was promptly
reversed.' 0
As one who has discussed the pros and cons of resale price main-
tenance some time ago," I was recently consulted by proponents of
resale price maintenance who requested advice on various points
centering around the question whether their case merited a fresh
legal approach. My thought was and is at least three-fold. First,
though of secondary importance, is the thought that while the Fair
Trade label is a venerable one, it is not venerated in many quarters.
It arouses antagonism as unduly self-righteous. There are wide dif-
ferences of opinion concerning the economic merits and demerits of
resale price maintenance. Legislatures and courts have never stood
aloof from the controversy, at least in modem times, and the problem
is essentially an aspect of modem mass distribution. Legislatures Ind,
to a lesser extent, judges have to decide whether to favor or to ,oppose
resale price maintenance and both sides to the controversy cannot
win at the same time and place. The word "fair" should remain one
of the best words in the English language like justice or honor. It
should stay in the public domain and not be granted as a reward for
winning a legislative battle.
Secondly, and more fundamentally, the issues may be clarified by
8. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, 224 Ark.
558, 275 S.W.2d 455 (1955); Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 301 P.2d
139 (Colo. 1956); Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954);
Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613, 75 S.E.2d 161 (1953);
Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane Co., 143 N.E.2d 415 (Ind. 1957); Dr.
Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 231 La.
51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956); Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting
Goods Co.; 343 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952); McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis
& Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955); General Elec. Co. v.
Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956); General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales
Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956). In Virginia the Fair Trade Act has
been held.repealed by the Anti-Monopoly Act of 1950, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59-20
to -401 -(1949). Benrus Watch Co. v. Smith-Williams, Jewelers, 198 Va. 94,
92 S.E.2d 384 (1956). In addition to the foregoing decisions in state courts
of last resort there have been adverse lower court decisions in at least two
other states. General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Coop., CCH TRADE REG.
REP. f[ 68,341 (Cir. Ct. Jefferson Co., Ky., 1956); Rogers Kent, Inc. v. General
Elec. Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 68,625 (Richland Co. Ct. S.C., 1956).
The weight of authority by number of jurisdictions still sustains such acts.
Measured by volume of business the preponderance sustaining is heavier.
As of'Sept. 1, 1957, the five most populous states are still fair trade jurisdic-
tions. Texas with no act and Michigan on the above list, with a combined
population approaching that of New York, are the only exclusions in the first
ten states in population and wealth. In weighing the practical status of fair
trade, adverse considerations are the trend as an indicator of opinion and the
difficulties of enforcement in areas adjacent to breaks in the once almost solid
front.
9. Sunbeam Corp v. Richardson, 144 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Ky. 1956).
10. Sunbeam Corp. v. Richardson, 243 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1957).
11. McLaughlin, Fair Trade Acts, 86 U. PA. L. REv.'803 (1938). The spelling
of the surname was changed by order of court in 1948, correcting an error
made in Scotland in the early nineteenth century.
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renouncing the device of the non-signer clause. Where antagonism is
not aroused by the use of the Fair Trade label, it can flow from a sense
of outrage at holding a man to a contract he never made. The real
case for resale price maintenance can be formulated in quite different
terms.
Thirdly, in such a matter of national concern Congress should take
the lead in determining a 'national policy, instead of drifting in the
wake of state law.u The following draft of a proposed federal statute
has benefited from the criticism of a considerable number of advocates
with experience in related fields.
AN ACT To EQuALIZE RIGHTS IN THE DISTRIBUTION
OF IDENTIFIED MERCHANDISE
Section 1. Findings of Fact and Declaration of Policy.
This Act shall be construed with reference to the findings of fact and
declarations of policy in this Section contained. The public interest and
economic efficiency are promoted by competition between manufacturers,
w Ihether or not the individual manufacturers control the prices to the
consuming public of the articles they respectively produce. A manufac-
turer may legally control the price of his goods to the ultimate consumer
by distributing his goods entirely through departments of his own organi-
zation. l e may also achieve the same result by consigning goods to
distributors and retaining legal title to the goods until they are sold to
the ultimate consumer. These methods of distribution are available to
large manufacturers, but are commonly beyond the means of small manu-
facturers. Manufacturers large and small, however, normally have an
interest in the wide and effective distribution of their goods. Independent
distributors seek under the law of supply and demand and the price
mechanism to handle those products where the spread between their
buying and their resale prices is adequate to recompense their active
efforts to distribute the merchandise. Manufacturers who do not limit
their distribution to direct retail sales accordingly have a legitimate
interest in seeing the prices of their goods to the consuming public kept
high enough to interest distributors and low enough to compete effectively
with.other goods adapted to serve the same needs of ultimate consumers.
TPhis is particularly true of trademarked goods and goods sold under trade
names which identify the goods as the product of the manufacturer. The
same considerations apply with less frequency, but with equal force, to
the case of distributors marketing their own brands. Owners of identified
merchandise commonly conduct advertising campaigns directed to the
ultimate consumer with a view to promoting sales at a price established by
them. Such promotion is advantageous to distributors, particularly small
distributors who do not have the resources for advertising on a compara-
ble scale.
There is a public interest in according to the small manufacturer or
small wholesale distributor an opportunity to compete on more nearly
equalterms with the large manufacturer or distributor who can afford to
control the distribution of his products through his employees or con-
12. The idea of such a federal statute did not originate with the author.
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signees. There is a further public interest in encouraging survival of
small distributors who, comprising the bulk of small business, add a
time and place utility to goods by making them readily accessible to
consumers. The public interest in bringing goods of established quality
to the consuming public at the lowest possible price consistent with what-
ever distribution service the various members of the public expect and
demand can be best served by fostering competition in the price of particu-
lar products between producers and between trademark and brand owners,
who must also compete for the favor of the consuming public upon the
basis of the quality of their goods and of the distribution services rendered
in connection therewith.
This Act is designed further to implement the basic policy of the Anti-
Trust Laws, but, to the extent of any conflict of specific provisions, it is
intended to modify all previous enactments of the Congress of the United
States.
Section 2. Definitions.
The word "commerce" means all commerce that may be lawfully regu-
lated by Congress.
The term "trade name" includes personal names, and any other words
or symbols used by manufacturers or merchants to identify their com-
panies, firms or corporations.
The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol or device or
any combination thereof used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify
his merchandise and distinguish it from that manufactured or distributed
by others.
A "distributor" includes a broker, jobber, wholesaler, retailer or other
person who buys a proprietor's merchandise for purposes of resale. It
excludes ultimate consumers who do not make a business of reselling
merchandise.
A "proprietor" is one who identifies merchandise manufactured or dis-
tributed by him by the use of his trademark or trade name. He is deemed
to retain a proprietary interest in such merchandise after he has sold it
to distributors, by reason of his interest in stimulating demand for his
product through effective distribution to ultimate consumers. Merchan-
dise bearing his trademark or trade name in the course of distribution is
accordingly herein designated as "his merchandise" and distributors han-
dling his merchandise are designated as "his distributors." Provided, how-
ever, that a distributor of merchandise identified by the trademark or
trade name of the manufacturer is not a proprietor within the meaning
of this Act unless he is an exclusive distributor specifically authorized by
the manufacturer to establish resale prices for such merchandise.
The term "commodity" means merchandise manufactured or distributed
by a proprietor.
"Actual notice" of established resale prices includes notice imparted by
mail, or through advertising, or through notice attached to merchandise or
containers thereof, or imparted orally. Deposit in the United States mail,
with postage prepaid of a letter properly addressed to a distributor and
specifying resale prices established by a proprietor shall constitute prima
facie evidence of actual notice of such prices. The purchase of or dealing
in merchandise clearly marked or enclosed in containers clearly marked
with resale prices established by a proprietor shall be conclusive evidence
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of actual notice of such prices. Actual notice may also be established by
legally admissible evidence without limitation of manner or form. A
person with actual notice of any applicable resale price is thereby charged
with notice that such a price is subject to change.
Section 3. Establishment of Resale Price Schedules.
It shall be lawful for a proprietor to establish and control by actual
notice to his distributors stipulated or minimum resale prices of his mer-
chandise in commerce which is in free and open competition with articles
of the same general class produced by others. He may so establish sched-
ules of resale prices differentiated with reference to any criteria not
otherwise unlawful. Such schedules may be changed from time to time,
by actual notice to distributors having acquired his merchandise with
actual notice of any established resale price. He may so establish such
resale prices for his distributors, even though he sells in competition with
them, so long as he sells at the applicable prices he has established for
his distributors making comparable sales.
Except as provided in Sections 7, 8 and 9, it shall be unlawful for any
person with actual notice of an applicable stipulated resale price duly
established by a proprietor to sell, offer to sell, or advertise merchandise
in commerce at a different price, or for any person with actual notice of
any applicable minimum resale price so duly established to sell, offer
to sell, or advertise merchandise in commerce at a lower price.
Section 4. Actions at Law.
Any person damaged by anything forbidden in Section 3 may sue in
any state or federal court of competent jurisdiction, including the District
Court of the United States in any district in which the defendant resides
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in contro-
versy, and shall be entitled to recover the amount of damages sustained,
plus the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Section 5. Injunctions.
Any person suffering or reasonably anticipating damage by reason of
anything forbidden in Section 3 may sue in any of the courts specified
in Section 4 without respect to the amount in controversy and obtain in-
junctive relief and recover costs of suit and a reasonable attorney's fee
without the necessity of proving specific monetary damage.
Section 6. Bona Fide Enforcement Required.
It shall be a defense to a proceeding under Section 4, or Section 5,
to prove that the proprietor is not making a reasonable effort in good
faith to enforce generally his announced resale prices, either through
litigation or other appropriate steps.
Section 7. Joint Action by Competing Proprietors Unauthorized.
Nothing in this Act contained permits two or more proprietors or two
or more distributors to take joint action in establishing resale prices for
competing commodities sold under different trademarks or trade names,
but all distributors of the merchandise of the same proprietor sold under
the same mark or name may cooperate with him in maintaining the
stipulated or minimum prices established by him, or his exclusive dis-
tributor specifically authorized for that purpose, and no such cooperation
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shall constitute an unreasonable or unlawful contract or combination
in restraint of trade.
Section 8. Proprietors With Only Local Distribution.
The provisions of this Act shall apply in the District of Columbia, but
shall not apply elsewhere to the merchandise of proprietors no sub-
stantial part of whose merchandise crosses state lines at any stage of
distribution. If a substantial portion of the merchandise upon which a
proprietor has established a particular stipulated or minimum resale price
crosses state lines at any stage of distribution, this Act shall apply to all
his identified merchandise to which that price applies, whether or not some
or most of such merchandise is entirely distributed within the state of
origin.
Section 9. Price Variances in Certain Cases.
It shall be a defense to an alleged violation of this Act for a defendant
to sustain the burden of proving that merchandise has been advertised,
offered for sale, or sold by him only in the following cases:
(a) In closing out the stock on hand for the bona fide purpose of dis-
continuing dealing in any such commodity, provided plain notice of the
fact is given to the public; and, provided further, that the proprietor
shall be given prompt and reasonable notice in writing of the intention
so to close out and an opportunity to purchase such stock at the original
invoice price;
(b) When the commodity is second-hand, damaged, defaced or de-
teriorated in quality and plain notice of the fact is given to the public
in the advertisements and sale thereof and when such notice is con-
spicuously displayed in all advertisements and affixed to the commodity
or the container'in which it is offered for resale; provided that the
proprietor shall be given prompt and reasonable notice in writing of the
intention so to close out and an opportunity to purchase such stock at
the original invoice price;
(c) When the commodity is advertised, offered for sale or sold by any
officer acting under the orders of any court;
(d) In the sale of any quantity of the commodity acquired prior to
actual notice of any established resale prices;
(e) In resales to charitable institutions or government agencies.
While the statement of policy in section 1 is as long as any that
might be appropriately extended in a statute, a further explanation is
in order. The following should be read as a direct sequel to section
1 of the above draft.
This Act contemplates that the economic forces operating upon the
producer or brand owner are adequate to protect the interest of the
consuming public. No manufacturer should be required to establish
or even suggest resale prices. 'Some goods are not practically adapted
to a resale price maintenance program, as bulk goods and goods
marketed in diverse channels where large differences in the quantity
and quality of distribution services obtain. Manufacturers in any line
are, and should remain, quite free to sell their goods, without estab-
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lishing resale prices, in- competition with the goods of others upon
which such resale prices are established and maintained. Goods dis-
tributed under resale price maintenance programs must meet price
competition from the goods of competing manufacturers and brand
owners who distribute through trade channels without establishing
resale price maintenance programs and also price competition from
goods marketed directly to the ultimate consumer by manufacturers
and brand owners. A resale price maintenance program in many lines
requires resale control upon successive resales of the same items
in order to enlist the services of wholesalers and retailers in traditional
channels of distribution. The policy hereby promoted, of enabling man-
ufacturers or brand owners to compete with manufacturers or brand
owners who sell direct to the ultimate consumer or otherwise avoid
traditional channels of distribution, requires a recognition of and legal
support for price schedules progressively increasing the price by
increments covering the respective services performed in each phase
of the distribution process. Manufacturers and other owners of trade-
marks and trade names who desire to control the price of their prod-
ucts to the ultimate consumer should be permitted to do so by notice
to distributors of their products establishing such prices at the various
stages of distribution and the law should protect their interests in the
distribution of their products by declaring a sale at other than prices
so established to be illegal, and by providing adequate legal and
equitable remedies for damages incurred or injuries in prospect.
So long as manufacturers or brand -owners who can afford to and
elect to maintain or finance directly all their outlets to the ultimate
consumer can and should under the Robinson-Patman Act main-
tain a single price for like merchandise and services at all outlets,
the manufacturer or brand owner who finds it feasible to maintain or
finance only a portion of his outlets should be permitted to elect
to establish a price to the ultimate consumer to be observed both at
his own outlets and upon resales by independent distributors. The
policy of this Act, recognizing the legality of price maintenance by
the manufacturer to ultimate consumers and promoting resale price
maintenance by manufacturers who control none of their outlets, is
consistently applied to the intermediate case of the manufacturer
or brand owner who controls some of his outlets only. Reliance upon
the maintenance of competition between manufacturers under the
antitrust laws, and the maintenance of competition between distribu-
tors in all respects except with reference to the price of the branded
goods of particular manufacturers or brand owners who have elected
to proclaim resale price maintenance programs, is equally sound and
equally applicable to the case of the manufacturer or brand owner
who engages in direct distribution in part only. Any appearance of
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horizontal price combinations in such cases is merely superficial and
misleading. The small or medium sized manufacturer or brand owner
who can afford to finance a portion only of his distribution through
direct sales to the ultimate consumer should, equally with the small
manufacturer who can afford to control no outlets directly, be en-
abled to compete with the financially powerful manufacturer or brand
owner who controls all the outlets for the distribution of his branded
products, and to that end the law should be so framed as to enable
the manufacturer or brand owner who controls some of his outlets
only to enlist the assistance of independent distributors through the
establishment of prices to the ultimate consumer to be observed alike
upon direct and upon resale distribution.
It is the essence of a resale price maintenance program to eliminate
competition between distributors with reference to the price of dis-
tribution services upon particular articles where the resale price has
been duly established. This fact must not be permitted to promote
any agreement or combination between manufacturers or brand
owners to eliminate or restrain competition between them, or be-
tween retailers to eliminate or restrain competition in any other
respect. Consequently, any program which is part of a combination
or agreement between manufacturers or brand owners to eliminate
competition between them, or which is part of a combination or agree-
ment between distributors to eliminate competition between them be-
yond the scope essential to the protection of the lawful interest of the
party establishing a resale price, is excluded from the protection of
this Act, and may fall within the prohibition of the antitrust laws of
the United States, or of the various states, or of other applicable
laws. This Act does not apply to goods not identified in association
with a trademark or trade name. Bankruptcy and other sales in
liquidation of a business are also excluded upon principles long ob-
served in connection with Fair Trade Acts.
Any effective resale price maintenance program must apply to
all the goods of the manufacturer or brand owner distributed under
the description to which his resale price notices apply. Court de-
cisions now, upon equitable principles, refuse to enforce resale price
maintenance programs in favor of brand owners who promote or
complacently tolerate distribution through some price cutting channels
while endeavoring to hold other distributors to the maintenance of
their listed resale prices. Such decisions are hereby reaffirmed and
codified. The manufacturer or brand owner who announces a price
to the ultimate consumer which he does not attempt in good faith and
with reasonable diligence to enforce is entitled to no remedies under
the law against price cutters. Any liability in such cases is that of
the manufacturer or brand owner, who may have damaged distributors
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by misleading them into compliance with a fraudulent or fictitious re-
sale price maintenance program.
When any appreciable portion of identified goods is shipped outside
the state of origin at any stage of the distribution process, there is
a direct federal interest in laws applicable to resale prices which is
within the scope of this legislation. Where substantially all of the
products of a manufacturer or brand owner are manufactured and
distributed to the ultimate consumer within the bounds of a single
state, the matter of resale price maintenance is left to state law.
The great bulk of branded or trademarked merchandise available for
resale price maintenance is produced or marketed by firms or com-
panies who engage in interstate commerce. Such firms or companies
must not discriminate against interstate commerce by adopting an
inconsistent position with reference to their local distribution and
this federal resale price maintenance law must not be stultified or
thwarted by claims that local distributors competing with distributors
without the state of origin are outside the power possessed, asserted
and exercised by Congress, so this Act is expressly made applicable
to all distribution of the trademarked or branded merchandise of
a manufacturer or brand owner any substantial portion of whose
merchandise of like kind is distributed across state lines, whether by
wholesale, retail, direct mail or otherwise.
Congress need not disclaim all power over local manufacture and
distribution which may, by weakening small business or otherwise,
impair interstate commerce, precipitate bankruptcies, undermine the
bases of federal taxes or weaken the power of the nation to engage
in war. But the theory of this Act is to leave the manufacturer or
brand owner, small or large, free to embrace resale price maintenance
or to leave it alone. The small manufacturer or brand owner who
wants the protection of this federal law may presumably arrange to
distribute a material portion of his identified merchandise across
state lines. The policy of this Act does, however, apply to the District
of Columbia and the Act accordingly applies to all distribution into
or from said District. The population of the District is not large in
relation to the population of the United States, but it is large in
relation to the area of the District, so that a very large portion of dis-
tribution here is connected with interstate commerce. Furthermore,
the same needs of small manufacturers or brand owners which sup-
port the Act on a national basis support its application on a local basis
to the District of Columbia.
Congress should reaffirm its faith in antitrust laws designed to
preserve the benefits of the operation of the price mechanism in
free competitive markets, but no preconceptions or precedents con-
cerning the construction and the application of the antitrust laws
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may restrain Congress from modifying or supplementing the law in
and peripheral to the antitrust field. This Act is deemed to supplement
the antitrust laws and promote the same ends more effectively, but
to the extent that it is held or deemed to be inconsistent with the pre-
existing construction and application of such laws, this Act must pre-
vail as the last pronouncement of Congress.
The Supreme Court, while showing no disposition to declare con-
gressional legislation unconstitutional, has repeatedly shown a dis-
position to construe Fair Trade legislation strictly. To preclude strict
construction of this remedial legislation it seems desirable for Congress
to assert an intent to exercise its full powers under the Constitution,
but in the exercise of such powers expressly to except from the law
certain designated subject matter, just as bankruptcy sales have long
been excluded from the operation of state Fair Trade Acts. Accord-
ingly, there is an express exclusion from the operation of the Act of
purely local production and distribution outside the District of
Columbia. Any attempt to exhaust federal constitutional power here
would invite litigation concerning the limits of such power of cost
disproportionate to any legitimate interest to be served and would
so be detrimental to the public interest.
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